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Labor Arbitration and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 sets forth certain broad
prohibitions of discrimination against individuals on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Although Title VII deals with
discrimination by employers, 2 employment agencies3 and labor unions,
4
this comment will concern itself only with the employer, and, more
specifically, with one particular problem arising from an employer-
employee relationship.5
A discriminatory act by an employer against an employee which
constitutes a violation of the provisions of Title VII may also be a viola-
tion of other local, state or federal laws, and may be a violation of a
provision of the collective-bargaining agreement governing the em-
ployer-employee relationship. Each of these separate violations may
give rise to an independent remedial right. Each such separate remedial
right may lead to a different forum for purposes of adjudicating the
controversy. A current question of substantial significance and com-
plexity is whether an individual who believes that he has been the
subject of a prohibited discriminatory act should be permitted to pursue
a remedy in a multiple number of forums for this single act of dis-
crimination, or should be limited to having his case tried once and
conclusively determined. Specifically, this comment will deal with the
problems arising from the situation where an employee claiming dis-
crimination seeks relief through a grievance and arbitration procedure
pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and either
1. Title VII, §§ 701-16(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
4. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
5. Id. § 2000e-2(a). This section specifically provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
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concurrently or subsequently seeks relief for the same allegedly dis-
criminatory act by taking his problem to an appropriate state or federal
agency, or by directly filing suit in the federal or state courts.
To determine where the courts may go when faced with a situation of
the nature just described, we will first consider where the courts have
already gone when faced with this problem, and they have gone in a
variety of directions for a multitude of different reasons. As will be seen,
the question has caused a division among the federal appellate courts,
and the only case reaching the United States Supreme Court resulted in
a four-four ballot. Some consideration will then be given to certain
factors to which the author feels the courts have failed to give sufficient
weight in considering the problem, and, finally, some tentative sug-
gestions as to a compromise solution will be proposed.
II. THE CASE LAW
A. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company
In the fall of 1969 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit became the first appellate court to face the question of defining
the relationship between an action in the federal courts under Title VII
and an action involving the same issue brought to arbitration pursuant
to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement governing the
terms of the concerned employer-employee relationship. In the case of
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.6 the court was faced with a claim
brought by female employees of one of Colgate's plants alleging that
they were intentionally discriminated against by a system of job classi-
fication which deprived them of certain promotional opportunities, and
that they were subject to discriminatory layoffs under a segregated plant
seniority system based upon sex. Prior to trial, the district court re-
quired the plaintiffs to elect whether they would pursue their statutory
remedy in federal court, or seek a remedy through utilization of the
grievance and arbitration procedure according to the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The appellate court unanimously re-
versed, holding that the trial court had erred by not permitting the
plaintiffs to pursue a remedy in both the court and through their
grievance and arbitration procedure. The only restriction which the
appellate court would apply was that an election of remedies would be
6. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) rev'g 272 F. Supp. 332(S.D. Ind. 1967).
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required so as to preclude the possibility of duplicate relief which
would result in an unjust enrichment or windfall to the plaintiffs.7
While the court recognized that their holding resulted in requiring a
defendant to defend in two different forums, they were more concerned
with what they considered to be "crucial differences" between the two
processes and the remedies afforded by each. They were also concerned
that:
[T]he arbitrator may consider himself bound to apply the contract
and not give the types of remedy which are available under the
statute .
To understand the development of the subsequent case law in this
area, it should be noted that in this case the plaintiffs had not at the
time of commencement of the federal suit actually presented their
grievance in arbitration.
B. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company
The second appellate court to consider the arbitration question was
the Sixth Circuit. In the case of Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company9
the court was asked to decide whether an employee who was allegedly
wrongfully discharged from his employment because of his religious
beliefs could bring an action in federal court under the provisions of
Title VII after a grievance which had been filed by the employee under
the provisions of his collective bargaining agreement had been finally
adjudicated and denied in arbitration.
The specific facts of the Dewey case are worth detailing inasmuch as
they vividly reveal the succession of actions which a determined em-
ployee can pursue. Dewey was discharged from his employment because
of his repeated refusal either to work on Sunday or provide a replace-
ment in accordance with established plant rules. Believing that he had
been discriminatorily discharged because of his religion, Dewey filed
a grievance to this effect in accordance with the provisions of the applica-
ble collective bargaining agreement. The grievance was processed
through the various steps of the grievance procedure and an arbitration
hearing was held in April, 1967. In June, 1967, the arbitrator issued a
ruling denying Dewey's claim.
7. Id. at 715.
8. Id.
9. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) aff'd 402 U.S. 689 (1971). (Affirmed by a divided Court.)
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Contemporaneously with the filing of his grievance, Dewey filed a
similar charge with the Michigan State Civil Rights Commission. The
Commission found that there were insufficient grounds upon which to
issue a complaint against Dewey's former employer. Dewey then re-
quested the United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance to
review his charges of religious discrimination, and that office also found
no basis for such a charge. Finally, on January 4, 1967, Dewey filed a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging
that he had been discriminated against because of his religion. This
Commission investigated the charge, and determined contrary to the
recommendation of its Regional Director, that there was reasonable
cause to believe that the employer had violated Title VII. After un-
successful attempts to conciliate, the Commission notified Dewey of his
right to bring a suit under section 706 of the Act.10 The district court
ruled that Dewey's previous pursuit of his contractual remedy did not
preclude his bringing a suit under Title VII to the federl courts, and
upon hearing the case on its merits, decided the allegation of discrimina-
tion in Dewey's favor. The court of appeals reversed.
Unfortunately, for those who have subsequently attempted to assess
the significance of the Dewey decision, the court of appeals in its deci-
sion first reviewed in detail the holdings of the district court on the
merits of the case, and specifically reversed the lower court's rulings.
Only after reversing upon the merits did the appellate court consider
the argument raised below that pursuit of the contractual remedy
should be a bar to seeking further relief upon the same charge but in a
different forum.
The court of appeals, in its discussion of the effect of the prior arbitra-
tion decision, noted the arbitrator clearly had jurisdiction to determine
the grievance inasmuch as it involved an interpretation of a term of the
collective bargaining agreement. Judge Weick, writing for the majority,
stated that:
Where the grievances are based on an alleged civil rights violation,
and the parties consent to arbitration by a mutually agreeable arbi-
trator, in our judgment the arbitrator has a right to finally deter-
mine them. Any other construction would bring about the result
present in the instant case, namely, that the employer, but not the
employee, is bound by the arbitration.
This result could sound the death knell to arbitration of labor
10. Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
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disputes, which has been so usefully employed in their settlement.
Employers would not be inclined to agree to arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements if they provide only a one-way
street, i.e., that the awards are binding on them but not on their
employees.
The tremendous increase in civil rights litigation leads one to the
belief that the Act will be used more frequently in labor disputes.
Such use ought not to destroy the efficacy of arbitration."
For the majority of the court in Dewey the issue was viewed as:
[N]ot whether arbitration and resort to the courts could be main-
tained at the same time; rather our case involves the question
whether suit may be brought in court after the grievance has been
finally adjudicated by arbitration.12
The decision in Dewey was appealed to the Supreme Court and affirmed
by an equally divided court.
Of significance in the later development of this area of the law in the
Sixth Circuit is that Judge Weick in writing for the majority made no
reference to the prior decision by the Seventh Circuit in Bowe v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., nor did he use the expression "election of remedies."
Judge Combs, writing in dissent, did both; he characterized the decision
of the majority as based on an election of remedies application, and
relied on Bowe to counter such an argument.
C. Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc.
Less than a month after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey, the
Fifth Circuit, in the case of Hutchings v. United States Industries,
Inc.,13 chose to reverse its lower court and follow the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Bowe. In Hutchings, a Negro employee, who had twice been
to arbitration to protest his employer's failure to promote him, and
who had lost both times, was held entitled to bring an action based
upon this same claim in federal court under Title VII. In addition, the
court held that even though the employee did not file a charge until
154 days after the alleged violation, the 90-day requirement of section
706(d)' 4 of the Civil Rights Act was tolled when the employee invoked
11. 429 F.2d 324, 332.
12. Id.
13. Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
14. Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964).
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the contractual grievance procedure in an attempt to obtain private
settlement of the suit.
Judge Ainsworth, in writing for a unanimous court, reviewed the em-
phasis which Congress has placed in Title VII on private settlement
of discriminatory practices without litigation, but noted that when
voluntary compliance cannot be achieved, and the EEOC has issued the
right to sue notice, the individual has perfected his right to seek judicial
consideration of his grievance. Continuing, Judge Ainsworth wrote:
To the federal courts alone is assigned the power to enforce com-
pliance with section 703(a), and the burden of obtaining enforce-
ment rests upon the individual claiming to have been aggrieved
by its violation.. . . When, as frequently is the case, the alleged dis-
crimination has been practiced upon the plaintiff because he is a
member of a class that is allegedly discriminated against, the court
trying a Title VII suit bears a special responsibility in the public
interest to resolve the employment dispute by determining the
facts regardless of the individual plaintiff's position, . . . for
"whether in name or not, the suit is perforce a sort of class action
for fellow employees similarly situated. '" 15
In contrast to their belief that the trial judge in a Title VII case bears
a special responsibility in the public interest due to the class nature of
the action, the Hutchings court viewed the arbitration process as a pri-
vate one essentially tailored to the needs of the contracting parties. The
court also expressed its concern that in the arbitration proceeding the
arbitrator's role is to determine the contract rights of the employees, as
distinct from the rights afforded them by enacted legislation such as
Title VII, and consequently to allow resort to arbitration to be a bar to
pursuit of a legislative remedy may result in the complainant never
having the opportunity to determine whether he has been deprived of a
statutorily protected right.16
In reversing, the court noted that the only application of an election
of remedies doctrine to Title VII cases should be to the extent necessary
to insure that a plaintiff not receive duplicate relief in the public and
private forums which would result in an unjust enrichment to him.' 7
Of special significance, and even greater puzzlement, is the court's
footnote to its reversal order:
Because the rights and remedies at issue in the grievance or arbitra-
15. 428 F.2d 303, 310.
16. Id. at 313.
17. Id. at 314.
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tion proceeding and the rights and remedies at issue in the Title
VII case differ, the arbitrator's award or grievance determination
certainly are not binding upon the court. This does not mean,
however, that the award or determination ought to be disregarded
altogether. The courts should evaluate both awards and grievance
determinations or settlements in deciding Title VII issues of viola-
tions and relief. That is, the awards and determinations may prop-
erly be considered as evidence .... The record in this case does
not reveal whether Title VII rights, or similar contractual rights,
were ever considered during the processing of Hutchings' griev-
ances .... In view of the state of this record, we leave for the future
the question whether a procedure similar to that applied by the
Labor Board in deferring to arbitration awards when certain
standards are met might properly be adopted in Title VII cases.18
(Emphasis added.)
If the last sentence of the above quotation is omitted, the Hutchings
opinion is clear and unequivocal as to its holding and reasoning. The
last sentence either represents merely a little judicial fence-straddling,
or it indicates a sincere underlying concern over the apparent signifi-
cance of the holding with respect to the arbitration procedure as a
practical, viable tool for resolving employee-employer disagreements.
D. Spann v. Kaywood Division, Joanna Western Mills Co.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's even split in Dewey, the Sixth
Circuit has had two opportunities to reconsider its position in Dewey,
and on both occasions it has declined to broaden its holding and has in
fact, for all practical purposes, so restricted its result as to make its
practical usefulness to the employer almost nonexistent. In August,
1971, in Spann v. Kaywood Division, Joanna Western Mills Co.19
an employee, having obtained and accepted an arbitration award rein-
stating him to his position in appellee's plant, sought an additional
remedy from the court under Title VII which the arbitrator had de-
nied-back pay. The court held that the facts of the case were within the
court's previous holding in Dewey. The court, in referring to Dewey
stated: "[In Dewey we held] that pursuit of arbitration, without some
simultaneous use of court or agency processes, precluded judicial juris-
diction to later review the arbitrator's decision (emphasis added)." 20
18. Id. at n.10.
19. 446 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1971).
20. Id. at 122.
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However, as has been previously stated, although Dewey did not ap-
parently file suit in federal court until after the arbitration decision
was rendered, he did clearly make simultaneous use of agency processes.
During the period when his grievance was being processed, he presented
his complaint to both the Michigan State Civil Rights Commission and
to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Moreover, his charge was
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on January
4, 1967, and the arbitration decision was not rendered until June, 1967.
Therefore, it appears that either the court has misread the Dewey hold-
ing, or is consciously restating it in a manner to further limit its appli-
cation to only those situations where no recourse is made to either a
court or an agency until after the arbitration ruling has been issued.
Since their conclusion restates this same position it is hardly likely that
this narrowing of Dewey is merely the result of an inadvertent statement.
The court refused to accept Spann's argument that under the applica-
ble labor agreement the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to decide the
issue of racial discrimination. The court concluded that the provision in
the labor agreement stating equal pay should be paid for equal work,
and equal privileges must be granted regardless of race, creed or color
gave the arbitrator jurisdiction to decide an issue of racial discrimina-
tion.21 The court concluded by stating:
This case falls squarely within the reasoning and facts of Dewey,
and we intimate no opinion on cases falling without the scope of
that decision. We hold only that where all issues are presented to
bona fide arbitration and no other refuge is sought until that arbi-
tration is totally complete, Dewey precludes judicial cognizance of
the complaint. 22 (Emphasis added.)
Before leaving Spann, it should also be carefully noted (in order to ap-
preciate this court's next decision) that Spann specifically argued that
the arbitration proceeding was a sham because the union failed to
vigorously pursue the racial question, and that this argument was also
rejected by the court.
E. Newman v. Avco Corporation
In Newman v. Avco Corporation23 the Sixth Circuit was faced with
an action brought by a Negro employee on an employer's alleged failure
21. Id. at 123.
22. Id.
23. 3 FEP 1137, 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 1971).
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to provide a proper training period for the employee to learn a new job.
Newman was discharged from Avco on February 1, 1966, allegedly for
failure to perform properly a newly assigned job. On February 2, 1966,
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between Avco and the
union, a grievance was filed on behalf of Newman. The grievance was
amended one week later to include a specific charge that the discharge
was racially discriminatory, and in violation of the labor agreement and
Title VII. An arbitration hearing was conducted on April 21 and 22,
1966. In addition to union representation, Newman was represented at
the arbitration hearing by his own attorney who argued the allegations
concerning racial discrimination. Subsequent to the arbitration hearing,
and prior to the issuance of the arbitration decision on June 28, 1966,
Newman, on May 2, 1966, filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The Commission found reasonable cause to
believe that Avco and the union were in violation of Title VII. There-
after, upon notification by the Commission of failure to achieve volun-
tary compliance with Title VII through conciliation, Newman brought
suit against both Avco and the union on behalf of himself and all other
Negroes who were similarly situated.
The district court applied an election of remedies theory, granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the plaintiff's
class action. The court of appeals reversed. The court distinguished
Dewey by noting that in Dewey, as opposed to the case at bar, there was
a full evidentiary record so that there was no way of knowing whether
some or all of the four Supreme Court Justices voting to affirm reached
their conclusion on the basis of the merits of the case as contrasted with
the alternate procedural ground. The court then stated that:
Congress, intimately familiar with arbitration in labor-manage-
ment contracts, employed no language in Title VII which even
intimates support for the election of remedies doctrine. And several
courts have squarely rejected it....
Further, we do not read Dewey as based upon the doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies. The majority opinion of this court in Dewey did
not so characterize its reasoning. On the contrary, as has been indi-
cated it seems apparent that the second ground relied on for the
decision in Dewey was the doctrine of estoppel. This equitable
agreement holds that where the parties have agreed to resolve their
grievances before (1) a fair and impartial tribunal (2) which had
469
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power to decide them, a District Court should defer to the fact
finding thus accomplished. 24 (Footnotes omitted.)
The court examined the two criteria it deemed applicable to estoppel,
and concluded that the doctrine should not be applied at this stage of
this proceeding. In reaching this conclusion the court said:
[A]lthough Newman submitted his discharge to arbitration, he
did not have a clearly voluntary choice as to whether or not to do
so. The labor-management contract in this case is a typical one, the
union having gained a mandatory arbitration clause in apparent
exchange for a no-strike clause. The labor-management contract
required appellant Newman to promptly file a grievance and to
proceed through each step of the machinery, the last of which was
arbitration. Failure to file initially or to pursue each step to final
conclusion automatically rendered the discharge final. Had ap-
pellant ignored the quick and readily available grievance ma-
chinery of the labor-management contract, he would certainly have
been met at the federal courthouse with a motion to dismiss his
complaint for failure to exhaust his contractual remedies.25
The court then questioned whether the arbitrator even had the right
to decide the employee's race discrimination claims. Noting that under
the provisions of the applicable labor agreement the arbitrator's juris-
diction was limited to determining questions involving the interpreta-
tion of the terms of the labor agreement, that the arbitrator was
specifically prohibited from adding to, subtracting from, or changing
any of the terms of the agreement, and that the subject agreement did
not contain any prohibition against race discrimination, the court con-
cluded that "major aspects" of the case presented to the district court
were either not presented in arbitration or were beyond the arbitrator's
power to decide. "To such issues plainly neither the doctrine of res
judicata nor collateral estoppel can apply (emphasis added).1 26 The
court distinguished Spann by noting that there not only was there an
award, but the award, which was largely favorable to Spann, was ac-
cepted by him. Moreover, here, unlike in Spann, the employee charged
that there existed a "long-standing conspiracy to maintain a system of
race discrimination participated in by both company and union."27
24. Id. at 1140.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1141.
27. Id. at 1140.
470
Vol. 10: 461, 1972
Comments
III. DISCUSSION
The complex problem under consideration presents a classic example
of conflicting policies coming to a focus on a particular question, a satis-
factory resolution only being possible through some compromise of each
of the involved principles-a result which fully satisfies nobody, but
which yields a resultant vector that will hopefully continue to press
ahead in a manner representative of the national interest.
There clearly has been, and continues to be, a national policy in
favor of encouraging and protecting the arbitration institution as the
means for the final adjustment of labor disputes.28 However, an arbi-
trator's decision is, of course, only binding as to issues properly within
his jurisdiction. 29 Furthermore, there are certain recognized exceptions
to the doctrine of arbitral finality such as where there is a claim by the
employee of a deprivation of fair union representation.8" Finally, al-
though it seems too obvious to require statement, a conflict only exists
between preserving the finality of the arbitration process and pursuit
of a remedy in another forum if the same precise issue is involved in
both instances. Unfortunately, too many courts have failed to recognize
this point. For example, there is a clear distinction, and hence no true
conflict, between an arbitration decision holding that an employee was
not entitled to an available promotion according to the seniority pro-
visions of a labor agreement, and a finding by a court or agency that
the same employee was discriminated against because the applicable
seniority provision is itself discriminatory. Conversely, a true conflict
exists when an arbitrator determines that an employee was properly
discharged for fighting because he did engage in the prohibited act and
his discipline was not unequal to that accorded other similarly situated
employees irrespective of race, and an agency or court finding that this
same discharge was discriminatory. Again, no true conflict exists where
an arbitrator is required to decide an issue solely on the basis of the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. It is specifically pro-
hibited from adding to, subtracting from or modifying such provisions,
28. See the Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
29. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
30. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1966).
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and the concerned agreement does not include an anti-discrimination
clause. Of course, the courts shall have to be constantly vigilant to detect
the presence of a litigant who arbitrates, and loses, on one issue and then
comes to the courts with the same basic charge presented perhaps in a
slightly different manner.
With the current concern for the rights of the individual and the un-
questioned need to eradicate discrimination in all of its sundry forms,31
we have, at the time of weighing the various conflicting interests in-
volved in this question, given too little concern to the plight of the em-
ployer. While there are undoubtedly employers who continue to
blatantly discriminate, there are also a considerable number of employ-
ers who are making strenuous, good-faith attempts to be non-discrimi-
natory in their hiring and employment practices, and who have as
their goal the ultimate elimination of all traces of any prior discrimi-
natory practices. Employers in this latter group are certainly deserving
of consideration. Unless some substantial effect is given to the final
findings of whatever forum is the first to consider a specific allegation
of discrimination, the employer is, in effect, being required to play
Russian roulette. As he is taken from the arbitration proceeding, to a
local agency, to a state agency, to any of several federal agencies, he is
faced with the frustrating knowledge that at no point will he finally be
sustained as to the issue in dispute until he has been subjected to litiga-
tion in the courts; yet, the likelihood of an adverse decision is
omnipresent. The procedure is clearly not conducive to a prompt, final
determination of the issue, and such a lengthy process is of substantial
detriment to the employer. As a result of the length of such a procedure,
retroactive damages can increase to a point out of all realistic proportion
to the issue. The employer clearly has to bear the burden of the cost of
litigating his side of the issue, whereas the charging party may have the
benefit of the advocacy of a concerned agency, and may even be provided
with free counsel when the matter enters the courts.82 Moreover, civil
rights issues by their very nature often require extensive research into
employment records, detailing of job progressions, development of
31. Title VII has been interpreted as not only prohibiting present acts of discrimination
but as requiring the elimination of racially neutral conditions, such as seniority provisions,
which act to perpetuate the results of prior discrimination. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
32. E.g., Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964) provides in part
that:
Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem
just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize
the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs or security.
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hiring statistics-all at considerable expense to the employer.u As suc-
cessive investigatory meetings, conciliation meetings and hearings are
held, the employer must bear the cost of the disruption to production
resulting from the need to absent supervisors from their normal pro-
duction responsibilities so that they can appear and offer the necessary
testimony. A cost which may be difficult specifically to dollarize, but
which may be substantial in volume, is that resulting from the adverse
publicity an employer may receive as his case moves from one public
forum to another. Such adverse publicity may not only have a signifi-
cant negative influence on a firm's sales but, most unfortunately, adverse
publicity may give the employer a bad image in the local Black com-
munity and be a real deterrent to the employer's good faith effort to
attract and hire skilled minority members as part of an affirmative action
program.
IV. CONCLUSION
An individual who believes that he has been the victim of a prohib-
ited discriminatory act has, without question, the right to have his
claim adjudicated fully and fairly by a competent impartial third party
-once. Where a party has submitted his claim to the arbitration process
and an agency or court is asked to review the merits of this same claim,
the following suggestions may be found to be of some value in balancing
the conflicting policies which will be argued to the court.
1. An arbitrator dealing with an issue involving a minority member
should be keenly aware of the potential of future litigation. The arbitra-
tion decision should set forth precisely the factors considered in arriving
at a final holding. For example, whether the arbitrator considered the
issue at hand in light of an antidiscrimination clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, whether he was permitted to and did consider
statutory law,34 what precisely were the issues raised by the charging
33. See H. Kessler & Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 3 FEP
956 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 1971) where the court stated:
[T]he Court notes that arguments concerning inconvenience and difficulty in pro-
ducing information in Title VII cases have been made, and most often rejected ...
If the information or records sought is relevant or material to the charge under
investigation and the EEOC proceeds as authorized by statute, then any inconvenience
or difficulty . . . must be considered as a "part of the social burden of living under
government."
34. Although outside the scope of this comment, for an insight into the conflicting views
held by arbitrators with respect to their responsibility and authority to apply public law
to contract disputes see Mittenthal, The Roleof Law in Arbitration, PROcErEINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL AcAnmty OF ARBITRATORS (1968), and Sovern,
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party and the specific holdings of the arbitrator as to these issues, and
whether issues were raised by the charging party which the arbitrator
either found unnecessary to reach or which were, in his opinion, outside
of his jurisdiction. These key issues should be expressly treated in the
arbitration decision.
2. A court should address its attention to the critical question of
whether the claimant has previously been afforded the opportunity to
present his allegations fully and fairly before a competent, impartial
third party. A court should not concern itself with the presence or lack
of fine procedural distinctions which are wholly without substantive
effect. For example, it makes little sense to say that an individual who
files his suit in court the day before an arbitration decision is rendered
is entitled to be heard, whereas the individual who files his suit the day
after the arbitration decision is rendered is barred from bringing his
claim to the courts. It is readily apparent that there is no simple mech-
anistic test which a court can routinely apply to determine whether a
prior arbitration decision should act as a bar to further litigation. Each
case should receive careful consideration based upon its own peculiar
circumstances.
3. Even where a claimant convinces a court that he is bringing an
action substantially different from that which was decided by an arbi-
trator, the court should give considerable weight to whatever findings
the arbitrator did make to the extent they enter into the case at bar.
Such a procedure should act to dissuade attempts to finesse around the
prior arbitration decision.
4. The fact that the plaintiff appeared before an arbitrator in his
individual capacity and now comes to the court in a class action suit
should not cause the court to ignore the arbitration decision. By giving
the arbitration decision the full weight it is due, the court may be able to
conclude quickly that the plaintiff is not a proper representative of the
alleged class. Allowing too much significance to attach to the fact that
at some point in time between the conclusion of the arbitration pro-
ceeding and the filing of the court action a matter has been transformed
into a class action will only encourage the well versed attorney to make
class allegations in every suit he files subsequent to an arbitration pro-
ceeding. Such a result, in view of the complexities of litigating pursuant
to Rule 23 '3 would be a real disaster to both the courts and the parties.
When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, PROcFEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
M~rING, NATIONAL AcADsmY OF ARBITRATORS (1970).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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Moreover, courts should not too readily accept the argument that labor
arbitration is essentially a private proceeding while court or agency ac-
tion better represents the "public interest." There is a clearly estab-
lished federal labor policy of viewing arbitration as a substitute forum
for the public judiciary in which to dispose of industrial disputes. Our
national policy is, therefore, to leave to the hands of the arbitrator the
responsibility for the preservation of industrial peace, certainly an item
of national concern and public interest.
By considering some of the foregoing suggestions it is hoped that
courts, agencies and arbitrators will be enabled to better focus on the
nature of the substantive issue which they must decide, and move away
from simply mechanical application of fixed rules not really susceptible
of general application. Only in this way can the rights of all concerned
parties, the employee, the public, and the employer be adequately pro-
tected and a result in harmony with the forwarding of all of our national
interests be attained.
JOSEPH P. KELLY
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